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SURVEY

AN ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ORBIT

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publishers have decided to change the name his periodical to SURVEY since its scope now been widened to cover other countries than the U.S.S.R.

EOLOGY: DEFENCE AND COUNTER-ATTACK

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IDEOLOGY : DEFENCE AND COUNTER-ATTACK

PART I

Introduction

THE present number of our renamed *Survey* has a double purpose: to review current doctrinal developments in the Soviet Union as well as the measures taken to strengthen the Party's control over the expression of Soviet thought after the East European upheaval; and to present a picture that will serve as an introduction for our next number, which will examine Soviet cultural trends from an historical perspective.

There is an obvious discrepancy between the staleness of the present ideological output under the guidance of the Agit-prop and the vigour of the administrative effort to expand the department's cadres. To what degree this is due to the unsettled political background, how far it reflects the petrified mentality of the 'ideological functionaries,' and how much ideological anguish is generated under the surface, are questions which cannot be answered with any degree of certainty from an analysis of the texts. But they are all reflected in the current administration of the doctrine, and the reflection casts an indirect light on the political situation.

This issue is also intended as a point of departure for an historical analysis of Soviet thought in various fields, to be published in November; this will be a double number, coinciding with the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The attention of our readers is called to the subscription form enclosed with this issue.

PART II

THE SHADOW OF REVISIONISM

by Leopold Labedz

Introduction

EVER since the rôle of the political police was diminished in the Soviet Union, when Beria was accused of trying to put it above the party, the problem of ideological legitimation has been accentuated. It has become even more acute since the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, when Khrushchev knocked down the other pillar of the Stalinist consensus. The traumatic effects of his speech made themselves felt first in the external realm, but soon the signs of ferment appeared in the Soviet Union itself. Writers and historians became restless and the Soviet press gave evidence of the ideological uneasiness among young people. When events in Poland and Hungary served as a warning that heretical countries might offer to the orthodox a mirror of their future development, ideological reconsolidation became the order of the day.

There is little doubt that, however the latest struggle within the Presidium might have turned out in terms of personalities, the struggle against 'revisionism' and 'nihilism' would have been intensified to prevent a descent into doctrinal crisis. The increased hold of the party over the state aimed at in Khrushchev's reforms, and his reliance on the *apparatchiki*, make the need for an elaboration of the ideological *raison d'être* of the party even more obvious.

In 1956 agit-prop was put on the defensive. The 'thaw' and the breakdown of the ideological unity of the Communist countries exposed its functionaries to the consequences of Khrushchev's speech. The absence of a single doctrinal authority made it difficult to undertake the 'creative development of Marxism-Leninism'; and so the ideological counter-offensive had to be started at a time when it was more difficult than ever before to avoid ambiguity and to provide ideological clarification in the midst of political confusion. But indoctrination is a highly organised business in the Soviet Union; the measures taken to counteract the possible spread of ideological doubts included the expansion of the party schools to increase the number of 'ideological functionaries,' tightening control over the ide logical content of publications, and the foundi of new periodicals to deal with doctrin problems in various fields.

The agit-prop Conference

To give encouragement to the ideologic counter-offensive an all-Union conference heads of Social Sciences Departments was he in the Kremlin between June 14 and 22, attend by the now deposed Shepilov. In his openi speech the head of agit-prop, F. V. Konstantinc elaborated the tasks confronting the 'ideologic functionaries' and criticised their failings:

'The imperialist bourgeoisie, in its strugg against socialism and the national-liberati movements, makes wide use of its poisono ideological weapons. In this situation it essential to strengthen ideological work a reinforce the spirit of the offensive in the prop ganda of Marxist-Leninist theory. . . . If t teaching of Marxism-Leninism is to be r abstract but alive it must be directed not or against its past enemies but also against t enemies of today. . . .'

Konstantinov laid stress on the new policy rehabilitating Stalin: 'Under the guise of co bating the cult of the individual leader so teachers of party history . . . have consigned oblivion some very important works of J. Stalin . . . Stalin courageously and uncomp misingly defended the cause of Marxis Leninism and he occupies an important pl in the history of the struggle for socialis He then directed special attention to 'problems of philosophers in the struggle w contemporary bourgeois ideology. Profou criticism of modern bourgeois philosophy a sociology is one of the most important ta of Soviet philosophers. The periodical *Vopr Filosofii* does an inadequate job of help teachers in higher educational institutions in critique of contemporary schools of bourge philosophy and sociology. . . . Our teach know little about these subjects and hardly e criticise them in their lectures. They do a p job of demonstrating the radical cont between the Marxist-Leninist outlook and reactionary, anti-scientific philosophy of imperialist bourgeoisie. . . . We publish l or no bourgeois literature on which our ph sophers might sharpen their critical teeth.'

The perennial dilemma of how to criticise
hout providing ground for the spread of the
as criticised, cannot be solved by the Soviet
ologists, but professional vested interest
netimes makes them overlook this. During
discussion following Konstantinov's speech,
I. Oizerman, head of the department of the
tory of foreign philosophy at Moscow Univer-
, asked that 'teachers should be supplied
h the necessary materials for independent
icism of various trends of contemporary
rgeois ideology. . . . Bourgeois philosophy
only one opponent—Marxism-Leninism.
e bourgeois theoreticians take advantage of
ry opportunity to strike a blow against
rxism-Leninism and in doing so they stop at
hing, neither falsification nor slander. The
as of bourgeois philosophy may penetrate
country through philosophical and scientific
tings and belles-lettres, or through the media
radio, cinema, and drama. We must know
w to combat these ideas.'

How has this requirement been met in recent
viet writings?

e hero in history

The criticism levelled at *Voprosy Filosofii*
ms to be due more to the inevitable lag
ween its publication and the change in the
ty line than to deviationist tendencies, which
ught about the dismissal of the editorial
ard of *Voprosy Istorii*. It is true that the
ginnings of a 'thaw' were noticeable in the
umns of the journal, but only one article
lected it in a bolder form: this was 'On the
blem of the gulf between drama, the theatre,
d real life,' by B. A. Nazarov and O. B.
idneva. At the conference of the Institute of
ilosophy in December, 1956, the editor of
prosy Filosofii, M. D. Kammari, admitted
t it 'contained harmful statements directed
ainst the leading rôle of the party in the arts.'
also mentioned that some Soviet philo-
hers inferred from the rejection of the cult
personality that 'the struggle of the party
ainst Menshevik-inspired idealism is incor-
t.' But apart from a few lapses the line of
journal after the 20th Congress was fairly
udent. Indeed, at the same conference, it was
ticised by T. I. Oizerman for 'the feebleness
its fight against the consequences of the cult
of Stalin's personality in the realm of philo-
sophy.'

But by December Kammari was already in a good position to stress that 'it is necessary to rebuff those elements, hostile to Marxism-Leninism, who take advantage of the critique of the cult of Stalin's personality to smuggle in under this flag their anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist statements.' Kammari, the author of an extremely hero-worshipping philosophical work, *Marxism-Leninism on the rôle of the individual in history* (Moscow, 1952), said at the conference that the journal was going to elaborate the theme of the rôle of the popular masses under socialism.

Most of the old party hands in philosophy made the required turnabout, often presenting, in their special fields, the opposite case to the one they had previously advanced. Thus Konstantinov, who in Stalin's time went out of his way to stress the rôle of the great man in history, has re-discovered a less individualistic version of Marxism.[1]

Another 'collectivist' approach to the problem is offered by the head of the Institute of Philosophy, P. N. Fedoseev, in a pamphlet with the monotonous title, *The rôle of the popular masses in history* (Moscow, 1956). But the most original treatment is given by G. Ashin in *Man-hating sociology* (Moscow, 1957), a pamphlet dealing with various Western social and political analysts.

Ashin has found the theoretical formula for the cult of personality in Sidney Hook's *The hero in history*[2] (New York, 1943):

'At present the leading rôle in the propaganda of the idealist view on the rôle of the popular masses and of the individual in history is played by American bourgeois sociology. . . . In Hook's view "history would develop differently" if it were not for the presence or absence of a great man. . . . Hook tries to whitewash capitalism,

[1] F. Konstantinov, *The rôle of the individual and of the popular masses in history* (Moscow, 1946), and *The rôle of the popular masses in history* (Moscow, 1953).

[2] The East German *Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (1957, 2, p. 179) says of this book that 'it is written almost exclusively to "refute" the scientific Marxist theory of the rôle of the popular masses and of the individual personality in history.'

arguing that its faults lie not in the capitalist system, but in the perversity of single individuals.'

Having so cleverly turned the tables on the 'bourgeois ideologists,' Ashin sketches a few more characteristics of this 'active preacher of the cult of personality': 'Like the fascists, Hook believes that democracy is incompatible with heroism. He proclaims the leader's independence of the people, his rôle as a unique causative factor in history, a force capable of moulding the "plastic universe" in accordance with his wishes.'

On western philosophers

'De-Stalinisation' and 'peaceful co-existence' influenced only slightly the treatment of Western philosophical writings, although, measured by the standard of performance in previous years, it became better informed.

The analysis of Marxism by contemporary French authors received attention more than once. In a comprehensive review, 'Against the idealist falsification of dialectics,' A. I. Vladimirova deals with the works of Henri Chambre,[1] M. Merleau-Ponty,[2] and Jean Hyppolite[3] (*V.F.*, 1957, 1, p. 162). All of them, she writes, attribute to Marx 'the idea of the end of history':

'Chambre gives as a proof of the death of dialectics the absence of class antagonisms and the existence of the State in the U.S.S.R. Merleau-Ponty explains away the same proposition by the existence of classes in the U.S.S.R.' Vladimirova gives the standard answer: 'In Soviet society there are no antagonisms, but there are contradictions.' Merleau-Ponty is condemned for 'openly proclaiming his preference for capitalism,' and Jean Hyppolite for the assertion that 'private property is not the only form of alienation,' and that 'alienation does not disappear under Communism.'

Another French writer has recently been portrayed in an article entitled 'Opium for the intelligentsia or the philosophy of history of Raymond Aron,' by I. S. Kon (*V.F.*, 1957, 3, p. 93).

Aron 'slanders the socialist régime and the theory of scientific Communism on a truly monstrous scale; some of his opinions are openly fascist. . . . He builds his hopes on the effect of corrosive scepticism within the ranks of the protagonists of socialism.' This profile appeared on the eve of the international conference of philosophers, which took place in Warsaw in July, and was attended both by Aron and by Soviet philosophers.

The Polish organisers of the conference claimed to have initiated 'a dialogue between East and West.' The back door of a heretical satellite can indeed open the way to 'corrosive scepticism,' and there were different interpretations of Marxism at the conference, given not only by its Western but also by its Eastern adherents. The Soviet participants, however, did not budge. Theirs, according to Professor A. J. Ayer, was the undeviating interpretation.

The French existentialist philosophers have also been subjected to a critical dissection.[1] In *Basic trends in contemporary idealist philosophy* (Moscow, 1957), B. Bykhovskii characterises existentialism and its French representatives, Sartre, Camus, and Jean Wahl. 'Existentialism,' he writes, 'is waging an open struggle against the scientific outlook as such. . . . If existence precedes essence, and the essence of man is determined by what he makes of himself, then the difference between existentialism and Baron Munchhausen, who pulled himself up from deep water by his own hair, consists in the fact that the existentialist does not even possess the hair by which to lift himself up.'

It is probably Sartre's attitude towards the Hungarian revolution which provoked the remark that 'existentialism by its nature can be made compatible, if so desired, with the ideology of fascist aggression and with the policy of fomenting wars and hostility among nations.'

The main competitor of existentialism in the camp of contemporary idealism, explains Bykhovskii, is logical positivism. The strongholds of the former are in France and Western

[1] *Le Marxisme en Union Soviétique*, Paris, 1955.

[2] *Les aventures de la dialectique*, Paris, 1955.

[3] *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel*, Paris, 1955.

[1] The German existentialists, Heidegger and Jaspers and the phenomenologist, Husserl, are dealt with in a review of G. Mende's book, *Studien über die Existenzphilosphie*, by V. I. Mikheev and V. I. Shishkina, in *V.F.*, 1957, 3, p. 200.

rmany, and of the latter in Great Britain and United States. 'The philosophical apologists contemporary capitalism prefer to operate a thick fog because this makes it easier to serve the ideology of the ruling class as the ing ideology. . . . The philosophical struggle ends the radius of *partiinost* deep into the d of ideology and diffuses it into the most stract realms of thought, far removed from mercenary interests of the exploiting sses. . . .'

Logical positivism is an example of this ension. Since it is 'the direct continuation of achism' (as some of its protagonists admit[1]), nin's arguments in *Materialism and mpiriocriticism* are used to answer it. Its herents are said 'to agree in denying objective lity, existing outside and independently of our sciousness, and assert the primacy of mental er physical phenomena. But they always otest that they do not adhere to either an alist or a materialist solution of the basic oblem in philosophy, the relation between stence and consciousness, and that the oblem itself is not only not basic, but does t deserve the attention of philosophers; it is 'meaningless" pseudo-problem. . . . In order secure a subjective-idealist solution of this sic problem of philosophy, Ayer and his lowers . . . reject the principle of causality. . . . cording to Ayer there is no fundamental ference between illusion and reality. . . .'

A more knowledgeable 'Historical outline of philosophy of neo-positivism' was written V. V. Mshvenieradze.[2] He describes fairly equately the historical sources of logical sitivism in the Vienna circle and the mbridge school, and gives a critique of ttgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. dealing with the differences of opinion among ex-participants of the Vienna circle, shvenieradze is not free from inaccuracy. He plies, for instance, that Professor Popper's fence of metaphysics' in *Logik der Forschung* y be connected with the acceptance of aterialism.'

A relatively well-informed article, 'Philosophy and Psychology,'[1] by S. L. Rubinshtein, deals in part with Bertrand Russell's 'logical analysis.' Russell's philosophy is described as 'a masked form of militant idealism.' He has 'declared himself for the compromise between idealism and materialism, the result of which is his "neutral monism". . . . But the advocate of compromise should have known that compromise is only ostensibly the reconciliation of contradictory tendencies; in reality, a compromise always means sacrificing one to the other.' The article attributes to Russell's philosophy ties with behaviourism and pragmatism.

Pragmatism is described in Soviet philosophical literature as 'a popular school of contemporary American philosophy,' a subjective-idealist doctrine which denies objective reality[2]; or alternatively as 'having lost its influence in the United States' in favour of neo-Thomism, a wicked and wily 'enemy of science, materialism, dialectics, and progressive ideas.'[3] The Thomist philosophers, 'masking their dogmatism, are fond of quoting the words of Thomas Aquinas against submission to authority,' but 'their "anti-authoritarianism" is in reality the most arrant form of authoritarianism reinforced by absolute religious sanctions.'

The conclusions of this survey of contemporary 'bourgeois philosophy' are themselves not wholly free from dogmatism: 'The struggle on the philosophical front for the survival of putrefying capitalism is generally conducted not . . . by means of an honest fight, but slyly, under the cover of darkness. . . . [However] the polemical writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are alive and help us today by providing the arms for the struggle against new enemies, under new conditions, and at a new level of knowledge.'

Cf. Prof. Toulmin in *Universities Quarterly* igust, 1957, p. 335).

V.F., 1957, 3, p. 39.

[1] *V.F.*, 1957, 1, p. 125. In *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1957, 3, p. 366. Russell's philosophy is described as 'a system of historico-philosophical falsehoods,' and Russell as 'an exponent of reactionary political trends within contemporary imperialist ideology. . . . He combines the propaganda of cosmopolitan ideas with a deep hostility to the revolution, an anti-Soviet attitude and an apologia for the imperialist bourgeoisie.'

[2] G. Ashin, op. cit., p. 7.

[3] B. Bykhovskii, op. cit., p. 19.

The dangers of revisionism

In all the philosophical polemics with outside writers in Soviet publications there was one exception: there were almost no disputes with the Polish revisionists on basic doctrinal topics. And yet the Poles during the last two years have published articles casting doubt on almost every aspect of the doctrine. In book form, Polish revisionism has been comprehensively expounded by the young Polish philosopher L. Kolakowski in *Philosophy and daily life* (Warsaw, 1956). But the Soviet theoretical and philosophical journals have shown considerable reluctance to take up the challenge.

The Soviet press has conducted a campaign against the general aspects of revisionism in Poland: *Pravda* referred to 'anti-Socialist statements in the Polish press,' *Kommunist* attacked Polish journalists for advocating 'humanist socialism,' and *Literaturnaia Gazeta* condemned Polish writers for rejecting 'socialist realism.' But Polish intellectuals, among them many young Communists, did not confine themselves to the criticism of Stalinist practice in literature and politics; many of them carried the critique into the realm of theory, attacking its most sacred tenets. Characteristically, neither *Kommunist,* nor *Voprosy Filosofii* thought it proper to argue with the philosophical revisionists in Poland.

The reasons for this reticence are probably twofold: For a time it may have suited the purposes of Soviet policy to pretend that its rebellious satellite is more orthodox than it has in fact shown itself to be, a fiction eagerly supported by its representatives. On the other hand, the internal repercussions of any debate which touches on fundamentals may have been regarded as potentially more dangerous than the disputes with the 'bourgeois philosophers.' The attractions of heresy in a situation of intellectual discontent and ferment may have been considered, no doubt with good reason, as more dangerous than 'bourgeois propaganda.' Polish newspapers and periodicals are distributed in Russia only in small numbers[1] but their presence, like that of Polish students and occasional delegations, acts as a stimulus and an irritant.[1]

Yugoslavia is now a less important potential source of 'heretical diffusion'; it has fewer philosophical solvents to offer. It does not permit the publication of such deviationist books as the one by Kolakowski.[2] Yugoslav writings, except for the book of the imprisoned Djilas which has been published abroad, are not likely to threaten Soviet ideological security. In a 'theoretical' dispute with Kardelj, the editor of *Kommunist,* Rumiantsev, dealt quite highhandedly with his 'petty-bourgeois, Proudhonist errors.'

The tactics applied to Gomulka are different. His speeches are printed and *Kommunist* has conferred on him the mark of orthodoxy. At the same time the Soviet press is pressing for, and reporting on, the curbing of 'revisionism' in Poland. *Voprosy Filosofii* (1957, 2, p. 222) announced that in future it was going to deal with 'the struggle against bourgeois ideology in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and other popular democracies.' Characteristic is the description the journal gave in its next number of a seminar attended by Polish and French scholars. It was held under the auspices of Unesco in Paris in October 1956 (on the eve of the Polish revolt), and among its Polish participants were some young 'revisionists' (including Kolakowski) in their most anti-dogmatic mood. They were quite outspoken. But the report in *Voprosy Filosofii* gives the impression that the Polish contributions to the seminar were quite undeviating in their orthodoxy.

Sociology and historical materialism

In Poland philosophical revisionism led to a revival of sociology as a separate discipline. The chairs of sociology in the universities have been restored, empirical sociological studies are

[1] '. . . they are quickly sold, and not only in Moscow and the Ukraine but also in Tbilisi and Baku' (*Polityka,* Warsaw, June 12, 1957).

[1] The Polish press reported that delegates to the Moscow Youth Festival vigorously defended the 'Polish October' in discussions with their Soviet hosts and young Polish writers disputed the merits of 'socialist realism' (cf. *Sztandar Mlodych*, August 1, 1957, and *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* August 13, 1957).

[2] Kolakowski was rebuked by Gomulka but not victimised.

ain being undertaken, and *Sociological* ?view, suspended in 1950, has been revived. n the other hand, the bi-monthly *Philosophical* ought, dealing in a Marxist fashion with th philosophical and sociological problems in theoretical' way, was suspended to make way r a new periodical to be devoted entirely to ilosophical subjects.

This seemingly esoteric question of specialisa-n, of the separation of *Diamat* and *Histmat*, of importance in assessing the chances of visionism in the Soviet Union. An empirical ndency inevitably carries with it the potential nger of a revision of doctrine.

At the conferences of the Institute of Philo-phy in October and December, 1956, several eakers emphasised the need for sociological vestigations.[1] The deputy director of the stitute, V. F. Berestnev, said in his opening dress that 'it is necessary to develop widely e study of morals, of the family, of social stoms and social change . . . and to co-ordinate ese investigations with the work of historians, onomists, ethnographers, etc.'

S. S. Pichugin declared that 'Soviet sociolo-sts are reluctant to tackle problems that arise connection with the necessity of collecting tistics, with primary work on factual data, ... The study of sociological problems is ndered, sometimes unconsciously, by the ten-ncy of some authors to narrow down and limit e field of sociology and reduce its scope to the ost general questions concerned with the velopment of society.'

Even Kammari appealed to the Soviet philo-phers 'to study more intensely the social enomena of real life,' and referred to 'the cessity of founding a Marxist sociological urnal.'

Aspirations towards a wider scope for and more empirical character of social analysis, iced at the two conferences, fall within the me category as the writers' claims for greater eative freedom, and the historians' appeal for enuine history.' They were made before the o-Zhdanovist line gained momentum and were reflection of the frustrations which had paralysed philosophers and others regimented according to the formula 'Non cogito ergo sum.' Similar leanings could also be detected in the reports made by the Soviet participants in the International Congress of Sociology held in Amsterdam in August, 1956.

Thus, P. Fedoseev, the head of the Soviet delegation, wrote : 'The sociological problems of work, culture, and social customs, of the family, morals, and of urban and rural life demand a more profound study and closer elucidation. . . . Few scientific works on such questions are published in our country.'[1] Academician V. S. Nemchinov concluded that 'we should also conduct specific investigations of social processes.'[2] And S. F. Kechekian expressed the same idea: 'We should study the specific, individual, and concrete problems of social life more extensively than we have been doing so far.'[3]

The reports on the sociological congress were less offensive in tone than previous writings on Western sociology, although the usual charges were made. Now, however, the tone has changed again. The passages on Western political and social analysts in the recent pamphlet by G. Ashin, already mentioned, echo an earlier style.

'Bourgeois sociologists preach that the people are allegedly incapable of acting politically, that the direction of society should be concentrated in the hands of a leader with "a strong personality," of an "elite"—the top stratum of the ruling class. Such theories reflect the hostility of the imperialist bourgeoisie towards the people.' (p. 17.)

Listed among the partisans of such theories of the political elite are R. Ross, H. D. Lasswell, Clinton Rossiter, R. Strauss-Hupé, and Walter Lippman. They do not even 'try to disguise the reactionary, anti-popular character of their pseudo-science'; for instance, Rossiter proposes 'the establishment in the United States of a military dictatorship headed by the President,' while Lippman demonstrates that 'the people have taken too much power into their

V.F., 1957, 1, p. 216. M. P. Baskin recommended oser ties with foreign scientists.'

[1] 'What the International Congress of Sociology has shown,' *Pravda*, October 19, 1956.

[2] 'At the World Congress of Sociology,' *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, December, 1956, p. 61.

[3] *The Third International Congress of Sociology*, Moscow, 1957, p. 35.

hands, that "for the normal functioning of the State" this power should be taken away from the people, who should be ruled with an iron hand.'

There is also the theory of an economic elite to be demolished: 'American bourgeois sociologists . . . not only deny the creative rôle of the people in the political and cultural sphere; they also try to dispute the decisive rôle of the masses in economic development and represent the workers as a passive element . . . allegedly incapable of directing and developing production. Indispensable for this purpose are the big business men recruited from the ruling classes who represent the most active and dynamic element.'

Such theories, it is asserted, are put forward, for example, by A. Nevins and James Burnham. The theory of the managerial revolution is singled out for special attack: 'The technocratic theory that capitalists are being replaced by a new class of managers is thoroughly false.'

The fact that Burnham applied his theory not only to the United States but also to the Soviet Union is not mentioned.

On Western economics

Western economic thought attracts Marxist revisionists. In Poland the theoretical organ of the party, *Nowe Drogi* (July, 1957), published a long article on Keynes by J. Zawadzki, who concludes that 'a critical study of Keynes' work can help Marxist economists as well to a better understanding of contemporary capitalism.'

But the two Russian specialists on Western economics, I. Blumkin and I. Dvorkin, emphatically disagree. They attack the Polish economic revisionists in an article entitled 'Contemporary bourgeois political economy and revisionism,' published in the first number of the new periodical *World Economy and International Relations* (July, 1957); in it they state that 'Keynesianism, like other vulgar economic theories in the past, is basically subordinated to the task of justifying and embellishing contemporary capitalism by soft-pedalling its antagonistic contradictions and by blunting the class struggle.'

There are two main ways in which contemporary capitalism, according to Soviet publications, tries to justify its existence: one is the so-called theory of 'popular capitalism'; the other is the social-democratic, reformist apologia for capitalism.

'Popular capitalism,' then, is a device through which 'the official propaganda of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Western Germany tries by all possible means to demonstrate to the workers that in the Western countries a completely new form of capitalism has emerged under which the means of production already belong not to the monopolists but to the people in whose interests the whole social change is being accomplished.'[1]

The editorial board of *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn* even organised a special conference of Soviet specialists on Western economics 'on the theme of the so-called "popular capitalism."'[2] The main task of the conference was to unmask its apologists.

Among those castigated were: Massimo Salvadori, for falsifying indices of comparative economic growth of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.; E. H. Chamberlin, one of the creators of the theory of imperfect competition, for his 'contrived scheme' of pure monopoly; J. Galbraith for his theory of countervailing powers; D. Stigler, for using artificial criteria of monopolistic practices; W. Roepke, for mentioning monopolistic practices in the trade unions; A. D. H. Kaplan, for obscuring the monopolistic character of the big corporations; R. Strauss-Hupé and S. Possony are described as 'two professors inclined towards fascism'; Seymour Harris as 'following the example of his Japanese and Nazi predecessors'; Ralph Linton as an avowed mouthpiece of American world domination; and C. Wright Mills and Ludwig von Mises as respectively, 'the bourgeois author of *The Power Elite*' and 'the bourgeois author of *The Anti-Capitalist Mentality*.'

The myth of American prosperity was successfully destroyed with facts and figures. The myth of the welfare state in Britain, accepted by the 'socialist' Strachey in his book *Contemporary Capitalism*, was likewise exposed. And the conclusion was reached at the conference

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[1] Yu. V. Borisov, *The superiority of Soviet over bourgeois democracy*, Moscow, 1957, p. 4.

[2] Its proceedings are reported in *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, 1957, 5, pp. 60-109.

iat 'the myth of "popular capitalism" has been ormulated by the lackeys of capitalism for the ecific purpose of fooling that part of the orking-class which can still swallow the bait.' n the words of a Czechoslovak author, 'life self teaches workers in the bourgeois countries iat the substance of capitalism is hostile to the eople, and that "popular capitalism" is a aud.'[1]

The social-democratic 'apologists of capitalism' e attacked no less violently: John Strachey's cent book has attracted particular attention. 'The sharpening of the crisis of British nperialism is bound to undermine the reformist osition in the British working-class movement. . In this situation the Labour ideologists have make certain corrections to their theoretical ncepts. . . . Their aim is to strengthen formist illusions. . . . One example of this is hn Strachey's *Contemporary Capitalism*.'[2] His Soviet critic writes that Strachey, who mself indicated his intention "to re-integrate arxism into the Western cultural tradition" y which he understands bourgeois ideology),' sifies Marxism 'by the device of criticising its eparate propositions."' He is making 'one ore attempt to refute the Marxist theory of lue,' but 'facts show that the gap between real ges and the value of labour has increased nsiderably and the absolute impoverishment the proletariat has become greater.' The conusion follows logically: 'The book is entirely voted to the cause of the defence of pitalism.'

Another reviewer maintains that 'Strachey, e Renner, Sering, and the authors of the *New bian Essays*, tries to demonstrate that in our ie capitalism has in reality ceased to be pitalism. . . . Power in contemporary capitalist iety, we are assured by Blum, Crosland, ossman, Sering, Benedict Kautsky, and ers, has passed from the hands of the owners the "class" of administrators.'[3]

The 'pauperisation theory' is receiving eresting treatment in Eastern Europe. In Russia and the 'loyal satellites' it still includes both the absolute and the relative pauperisation of the working-class in Western countries. 'The workers' situation in the whole capitalist world must be taken and evaluated, not merely the standard of living in certain categories—few in number—of qualified, skilled workers in the United States, England, and Western Germany,'[1] writes a Rumanian critic of Strachey.

In Poland both the relative and the absolute impoverishment of the Western proletariat has been questioned by the revisionists. The ex-Stalinist 'centrists' reply that the improvement in its standard is due to the 'pressure of the masses,' made possible by the existence of the Socialist camp. The Soviet variant of this ingenious argument simply states that any improvements, which are in any case partial and unstable, are the result of popular action led by (local) revolutionary parties.

Such divergences, implying the breakdown of doctrinal unity, account for Dvorkin's conclusion: 'The struggle against reformism, as well as against the reformism of the "national Communists," is an imperative task.'

Internal repercussions

Contact with outside ideas, whether Western or heretical, increases the potential danger that native deviationists may try 'under the guise . . . etc., etc.,' to undermine the doctrine and the position of its guardians. Previously a more complete isolation had prevented confrontation, and terror had strengthened the individual's tendency to rationalise. Now the persuasive force of the old clichés is declining precisely when it is most needed.

There are several ways out of this dilemma, and none depends on the ideologists alone. They are all ultimately connected with political decisions. A 'centrist' solution would be to increase compulsion while implementing some reforms to meet the pressure from below, thus defending orthodoxy while revising it gradually. Whether Khrushchev is groping after such a solution, and whether in this situation compulsion can be effective or persuasion convincing, are questions on which his career depends.

It is necessary to distinguish those causes of the present doctrinal confusion which are due

J. Medvecky, 'The myth of "popular capitalism,"' *dvoj*, July 25, 1957.

I. Sobolev, 'The reformist interpretation of italist problems,' *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezh arodnie Otnosheniya*, 1957, 1, p. 59.

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1957, 6, p. 92.

[1] *Rominia Libera*, July 19, 1957.

to the transitional character of the current phase in the struggle for power from those which are due to the doctrine's having gone 'beyond the reality principle' and to the difficulties of adjusting it to social change by the 'creative development' of Marxism, now that the stage is occupied by the *epigoni* of the *epigoni*.

Soviet philosophical equivocations reflect both factors. The relationship between the 'base' and 'superstructure,' between 'antagonistic' and 'non-antagonistic' contradictions, between formal logic and the dialectic—all these traditional themes in Marxist controversies in the Soviet Union are being constantly restated. The oscillations reflect not only the current slant of the power structure—with Stalin in the saddle, 'superstructure' was extolled and formal logic rehabilitated—but also more profound and lasting influences; 'superstructure,' although no longer esteemed as it was when Stalin wrote *Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics,* has not been wholly stripped of its previous prominence: Khrushchev's decentralisation is used as an example of its rôle by *Voprosy Filosofii* (1957, 3, p. 153), and 'base' has not been 'rehabilitated.' Formal logic, readmitted by Stalin (the conservative, stabilising element in the 'superstructure'), has not been discarded.

The terms 'de-Stalinisation' or 're-Stalinisation' have a relative meaning. Their use has confused rather than elucidated post-Stalinist developments. The ideological ups-and-downs which confront the Agit-prop are closely connected with the political situation and mirror the leadership's concern with the preservation of control. Internal disagreements on how this should be done and who should do it can be deduced *post factum.*

The revisionist tendencies from outside and from below pulled the Soviet rulers up sharp. The Soviet intelligentsia might have become infected and the professional intellectuals instrumental in spreading them if they were not checked in time. The rôle of the *literati* as vehicles of popular discontent is nothing new to them. Lenin had analysed the part they played as 'revolutionary baccilli.'

'Deviations' were therefore once more regarded by the leadership as endangering the system, whether they were expressed by writers becoming more 'realist' and less 'Socialist' or by historians suddenly attracted to Ranke's question.

Already in his conversation with the French Socialist delegation in 1956 Khrushchev said: 'Historians are dangerous people. They are capable of upsetting everything. They must be directed.'

After the Hungarian revolution he elaborated the idea: 'It must be admitted that some people among our intelligentsia let the ground slip under their feet and have been vacillating and wavering in their assessment of the personality cult. . . . The lessons of the events in Hungary, where the counter-revolution made use of some writers for its own sordid aims, show us where political carelessness, lack of principle, and weakness of character *vis-à-vis* the anti-Socialist forces, may lead. . . . One should regard the situation soberly and realise that enemies exist and are trying to use the ideological front to weaken the forces of Socialism.'[1]

PART III

PARTY TRAINING AFTER STALIN

by Wolfgang Leonhard (*Oxford*)

WHEN, in the spring of 1953, the post-Stalin leadership began to deviate in their operations from certain Stalinist practices, they also made a few cautious attempts to discard many of Stalin's ideological theses and to allow his more 'disturbing' writings, such as *Economic Problems of Socialism* and the *Short Course of Party History* to drop gradually out of sight. A vigorous campaign against 'Talmudism,' 'quotation mania,' 'parrot-learning,' 'stereotyped thinking,' 'abstractness,' was intended to cure party functionaries of the habit of learning the Stalinist formulas by rote and thus to prepare them for the changes to come. The directives on party training published on May 14, 1953, did not mention the *Economic Problems of Socialism* which had been the main text for party training since October, 1952. Its place was taken, in the treatment of current questions, by the statements of Soviet leaders after Stalin's death and the decisions of the Supreme Soviet session of March, 1953.

[1] *Pravda, August* 28, 1957.

In June, 1953, the campaign against 'learning rote' and 'dogmatism' was opened. An article pressly described as 'Material for propagan- ts, for political schools and study groups in party training system,' stated that 'to learn heart the conclusions and formulas of arxism, and to quote in all directions' had thing in common with Marxism' (*Pravda,* ne 10, 1953).

The first decisive revision of the study of party tory was made with the publication of the ses on the fiftieth anniversary of the Bol- evik party. These were issued by the Agitation l Propaganda Department of the Central mmittee in conjunction with the Marx-Engels- nin-Stalin Institute; Lenin's name was men- ned 41 times, Stalin's only four—and that rcely five months after his death. The theses re in future to be used as an adjunct to the *ort Course;* they emphasised that 'it is now re than ever necessary, in all our party paganda work, to put an end to the scholastic l dogmatic approach to the study of Marxist- inist theory.' What was required was not assimilation of particular formulas and tations,' but 'the understanding and applica- n of the real nature of Marxism-Leninism' *avda,* July 26, 1953). Two months later *msomolskaya Pravda* (October 2, 1953) com- ined that in party training 'theory was still ng treated in a rigid and formal way'; lents were 'inundated with meaningless tations and formulas,' and 'only rarely was e a lively and stimulating discussion in the ly groups.'

n February, 1954, it was openly admitted dogmatism—that is, clearly, adherence to in's theses—was a drag on the policy of the t-Stalin leadership. 'It is well known that matism and parrot-learning are injurious to training of our cadres, that they hinder an erstanding of party theory and hamper the essful execution of its policy' (*Kommunist,* 4, 3, p. 67). *Pravda* (January 7. 1954) even ed that 'many theses which played a positive at one time are no longer adequate for the nands of today.' It was the party's job to cate all Soviet people 'to guard against every- g that was old and conservative.' This ase, too, was clearly intended to denote in's theses.

Literaturnaya Gazeta (February 15, 1954) thereupon published a satire about two types of professors holding the Chair of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet high schools. Their names were Orthodoxov and Windmill. Orthodoxov's lectures consisted of quotations, while Windmill considered it harmful and dangerous to have any ideas or convictions of one's own. What was important was 'to keep your weather eye open to find out the way the scientific wind was blowing.'

The purpose of this campaign against dogmatism, Talmudism, parrot-learning, and quotation mania was undoubtedly to detach the ideological functionaries from Stalin's writings and to clear the ground for the introduction of new theses more in keeping with the requirements of post-Stalinist policy. The principal target was the *Short Course of Party History,* and the first step was taken early in 1954 by the re-issue, in three volumes, of the text of party decisions and resolutions from 1898 to 1953. This publication included a number of party documents which had not appeared in the earlier editions. An official commentary specially recommended the study of these volumes; their publication was 'of the greatest importance for raising the level of the entire ideological and political work of the whole party' (*Pravda,* January 15, 1954). The *Short Course,* published under Stalin's direction, was not even mentioned.

The change was greatly facilitated by the publication of the new textbook on political economy in the autumn of 1954; within a very short time it became the central text for training and for all ideological work, and the *Short Course* was pushed still further into the background; emphasis in training gradually shifted to economic questions and to practical questions of economic life; this, too, was a change which seemed necessary to the Soviet leaders in view of the changes in the management and planning of the economy.

The Voluntary Principle

While the content of party training after Stalin's death was thus partially changed, the system, the apparatus, remained virtually the same. Only in the early months of 1954 was an attempt made to loosen the rigid training system. In January the heads of the agitation and

propaganda departments and the science and culture departments of the regional and republican party committees met in conference in Moscow. *Izvestiya* (February 2, 1954) reported: 'Improvement in the quality of party propaganda, the ideological tempering of our cadres and of all communists, is indissolubly linked with *maintaining the voluntary principle* in party training organisations. It was noted at the conference that the relevant decrees of the central committee of the CPSU were grossly disregarded. As before, there is a drive to reach so-called "hundred per cent" results in party-training by getting all Communists inside the training network. It often happens that party members are pushed into training groups who have been through group training more than once before; Communists of advanced age, invalids, and women Communists with many children are compelled to attend the training courses and political schools. Cases have occurred in which, contrary to all common sense, people who do not belong to the party are forced against their will to attend party training courses.'

In a leading article on the previous day *Pravda* urged that emphasis should be placed on independent individual study. It was quite nonsensical 'to create artificial study circles for philosophy and political economy.' *Pravda* suggested the dissolution of study groups 'established by administrative pressure and bureaucratic regimentation, without regard to the personal wishes of party members.' The result of this proposal was, however, such a widespread mortality among political study circles and even district party schools that in July-August, 1954, the party leadership felt compelled to sound the retreat. The voluntary principle, it was now explicitly laid down, did not mean that it was up to the party member to choose whether he would take part in training or not, but referred exclusively to his choice of the *kind* of training.[1] Although this re-interpretation was frequently repeated between 1954 and 1956 the party press was constantly complaining that many training groups and courses had closed down since Stalin's death.[2]

[1] 'The most important task of party training,' leading article in *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1954, 10.

[2] Cf. *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1955, 6 and 9.

Precise figures about the numbers covered by party training in the Soviet Union have not been published since Stalin's death. At the twentieth party congress it was stated that up to 50,000 functionaries were trained annually in the short-term schools and seminars run by the party district and central committees in the various Republics. Between the nineteenth and twentieth congresses, that is, from October, 1952, to February, 1956, a total of 34,000 functionaries had received their politico-ideological training at the one-year and three-year courses given at district and Republican party schools and at the party high schools and the Academy of Social Sciences.[1]

At the twentieth congress, changes in party training were dealt with by Khrushchev, Suslov, Shepilov, and Furtseva. They all demanded greater emphasis on the combination of practice with party training.[2] Functionaries should be trained primarily to deal with practical economic problems. Khrushchev declared: 'The party can be proud of having been able to develop, to train ideologically, and to temper numerous cadres for all varieties of work in party, State and the national economy. But it would be wrong to overlook the serious flaws and errors in our work with the cadres. It is enough to tell you that our party schools turn out functionaries who quite often do not know the abc of applied economics. The training of cadres in party schools must be reorganised in such a way that together with the thorough study of Marxist-Leninist theory, students shall also master the fundamentals of production, and students in party high schools, in addition to their high Marxist education, shall receive practical training in some branch of industry or agriculture equivalent to that given at a technical college.'

He attacked those party officials 'who try to conduct ideological work in the abstract, in something unconnected with the struggle to accomplish the practical tasks of Communist construction. What is more, those who do this

[1] *Stenographic Report of the Congress* (in Russian), vol. 1, p. 123.

[2] This demand had been clearly made some time earlier, in articles in *Pravda* entitled 'For party propaganda closely connected with life,' and 'The link between ideological work and life must be eliminated' (November 24 and December 3, 1955).

ık their ideological work with practical day-
ay tasks are accused by these functionaries
over-simplification and utilitarianism, of
mising the importance of theory.'
ushchev referred to the preparation of a new
ook on the basic principles of Marxism-
nism to be used in party training, 'in which
most important principles of Marxist-
nist theory are explained in a clear, concise,
simple manner.' This was clearly designed
eplace the *Short Course of Party History*
h both Khrushchev and Mikoyan criticised
ıe congress. In addition there was to be,
rding to Khrushchev, 'a popular Marxist
ook of party history, based on the historical
, in which the epochal experiences of the
's fight for Communism are scientifically
ed out as general principles and events up
e present day are dealt with.' So far, how-
nothing further has been heard about these
new textbooks.

slov, the leading party ideologue, also stated
up to then current questions had been neg-
l in training; emphasis had been laid on
ast, and the history of the party had been
ıt in such a way that 'historical experience
ıot contribute to a correct understanding
ıe questions of today.' He quoted with
us approval the complaint of a Stalingrad
member: 'I have been studying the history
e party for thirteen years. Thirteen times
ropagandists have told us about the Bund.
we nothing more important to do than
ticise the Bund ? (Laughter.) What we are
sted in is the affairs of our MTS, of our
t and our region. We want to live for the
ıt and the future, but our propagandists
got so tied up in the affairs of the Narod-
ınd the Bundists that they can't find their
ut.' (Laughter and applause.) Parrot-learn-
ıd to be eliminated, for it meant that those
ngaged in it not only 'produce quotations
propriate and inappropriate moments' but
'regard reference to authorities and not
ce as the highest criterion of the correct-
of their views.'

pilov allowed that with the transition to
ıunism Marxist-Leninist theory became
nore important, but this did not mean that
ıunists should restrict themselves to
ning the theory; they were neither 'passive
guardians of the Marxist-Leninist heritage nor ideological archivists.' Ideological training which was not concerned with the most urgent economic and cultural tasks would become nothing but 'Talmudic parrot repetition of recognised truths and tenets or empty chatter.' To be an ideologically trained functionary meant before all 'to aim at success in the field of economic and cultural construction,' to raise the consciousness of Soviet people, and 'on this foundation to bring about an increase in the output of coal, steel, oil, power, machines, wheat, butter, meat, vegetables, and potatoes.'

The line proclaimed at the twentieth congress of linking politico-ideological training directly with practical economic questions, and Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin and some of his writings in his secret speech to the congress, were supplemented in the months following the congress by a series of explanations. Articles in *Pravda* on March 28 and April 5, intended as directives for current party training, interpreted the criticism of Stalin and defined the limits beyond which criticism could not be taken. More important was the central committee resolution of June 30 'On overcoming the personality cult and its consequences' which was published in *Pravda* on July 2. On the same day it was decided (no doubt by the central committee) to reduce the period of study at the party high schools from three to two years.

Ideological training since the Autumn of 1956

Since the autumn of 1956 there has been a certain change in party training. The ideological components have again been brought into the foreground.

This change is obviously connected with the repercussions of the twentieth congress in the East European states and with the discussion which went on inside the Soviet Union itself, and went 'too far.' In the late summer of 1956 a general ideological campaign was opened in the USSR against certain trends in the East European *bloc* which were growing steadily stronger and which were condemned in the Soviet press as 'dangerous deviations.' The campaign was directed primarily against 'national Communism' (that is, against the striving for greater autonomy and independence in the East European countries), 'nihilism' (that is, the desire

to pursue the criticism of the Stalin era further and more consistently than the post-Stalin leadership were doing), against 'demagogy' and 'rotten liberalism' (that is, those who advocated a quicker and more radical departure from Stalinism than seemed expedient to the Soviet leaders). The further this campaign was pursued the more important party training became, and the study of ideological principles was once more pushed into the foreground. The renewed emphasis on training was made explicit in the resolution of August 23, 1956, 'On the results of the school year in the sphere of party training and the tasks of party organisations in the new school year,' published in *Pravda* on September 2. The resolution stated that 'in many party organisations the political training of Communists is still unsatisfactory.' 'The false idea that Marxist-Leninist training is a matter of choice' came in for particularly severe censure. On the pretext of free choice many party members, 'including some leading functionaries,' had in fact altogether ceased their political training. Party organisations were to permit 'no relaxation of their training and propaganda work.' Training was particularly important at the present time 'in view of the new and great tasks of building Communism in the USSR and of Socialist construction in the people's democracies, and of the tasks confronting us in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the need to eliminate completely the cult of the individual and its consequences.'

The resolution of August 23 envisaged the following stages for the party school year 1956-57:

1. Political schools (*politshkoly*) as the 'obligatory elementary stage for all Communists.'

2. Study groups for current affairs (*Kruzhki tekushchoi politiki*) to study the decisions of the CC of the CPSU and economic and cultural questions in the USSR, as well as the most important events in the Soviet Union and abroad.

3. Seminars to study the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

4. Seminars to study the history of the CPSU. These were to concentrate on the history of the party after 1917 and on questions connected with the construction of Socialism and Communism in the USSR.

5. Seminars to study political economy, th problems of the sixth five-year plan and industry.

The instructions for the first party trainin year after the twentieth congress (October, 195 July, 1957) were clearly inadequate; above al it was found necessary to 'clear up' the questio of Stalin's writings. The criticism of Stalin the congress, and above all in Khrushchev secret speech (which, although not published i the USSR, became known in broad outline a large section of the party), had given rise a number of new problems, which the explana tory articles in *Pravda* of March 28 and April and the central committee resolution of June had not resolved, and which were the subje of discussion among party members. The offici party journal *Kommunist* (1956, 14, p. reported that the editors had received 'a numb of letters asking whether Stalin's writings we to be used in studying Marxist-Leninist theo and the history of the CPSU, and if so, whic Some asked whether Stalin's writings as a whc should not be disavowed.'

These ideas were rejected by the journ Criticism of the personality cult was not to understood as a rejection of the writings Stalin, 'who was a great Marxist theoretician In his capacity as general secretary of the pa he had made the central committee's repo to party congresses, and these were 'importa party documents.' A number of his writin particularly those from the period immediat after Lenin's death, had 'played a great part defending Leninism from distortion and in ideological struggle of the party agai Trotskyists, right-wing opportunists, and bo geois nationalists.' The writings to be stud in party training were principally *Foundati of Leninism* (1924), *Problems of Lenin* (1926), *Industrialisation and the right deviat in the CPSU* (1928), and *The right deviation the CPSU*. Stalin's reports in later years c tained both 'valuable thoughts and mate as well as 'erroneous and dubious ideas.' guiding principle in evaluating Stalin's w was provided by the resolution of June 30, 1

The Soviet party leadership has recently g particular encouragement to the current pc seminars. In the Ukraine, for example, number rose from 680 at the beginning of

14,000 at the end of the year, with a total 200,000 participants.[1] They are required to dy questions of current policy in the light ideological principles. 'Can the events in ngary, for example, be seriously treated in lation from the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle in the transition period?' s *Partiinaya Zhizn* (1957, 1). At one seminar, ich was to discuss the Suez question, the cher had first taken his group through Lenin's icles on 'The revolutionary proletariat and right of national self-determination,' and a caricature of Marxism' from the year 6, and his 'Letter to the American workers'; was held up as an example to be followed, ereas another teacher who had asked his dents to talk on the two-party system in the ited States, without adequate theoretical paration, was reprimanded.

The increasing importance of training was in indicated in the announcement in April, 7, of summer 'refresher' courses for ideo- cal functionaries. These are being organised urban, district, and Republican party com- tees, and are intended as preparation for the ning year 1957-58. From preliminary state- nts it can be seen that the study of party ory is again to be promoted in the training r October, 1957, to the summer of 1958; l the new textbook is ready the students are use Lenin's writings and the decisions of ty conferences and congresses. Study is to directed particularly to those basic questions he history and theory of the CPSU which particularly topical in present circumstances *rtiinaya Zhizn*, May, 1957, p. 39). The nal singles out as particularly topical such nes as the struggle of the bolsheviks against sionism, the theory of proletarian inter- onalism, the theory of the class struggle in transition period from capitalism to alism, and the rôle of the proletarian state the Communist party in the struggle to build alism and Communism.

In the spring of 1957 (the exact date cannot ascertained from the Soviet press) the central mittee of the CPSU called a conference of directors and secretaries of all party schools in the Union. The main speeches were delivered by the central committee secretary, A. B. Aristov (who, after the demotion of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov in July, 1957, was made a member of the Presidium), and P. N. Pospelov, director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism (formerly the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute), candidate member of the Presidium. The presence of these two members of the top-level leadership indicated the importance attached to this conference. Their speeches have not been published, but a report of the conference given in *Partiinaya Zhizn* (1957, 10) reveals some surprising facts about the development of training for the party élite. The course in Republican and district party schools has been extended to four years, that is, twice as long as it was in Stalin's time. The report also mentions 'inter-district party schools,' about which, however, no information is given. It may be assumed that these are newly-established party schools corresponding to the new territorial economic regions set up under the recent economic reorganisation. The number of students at party high schools has apparently increased to 16,000.

According to the same report, all party schools for functionaries now have faculties of Soviet economics, agriculture, and industrial production. Courses on the structure of the party and the Soviet state are 'one of the most important activities,' designed to train party and state functionaries in 'the correct methods of managing industry' and 'conducting party organisational work.'

In regard to the further development of party training, a warning was issued against both 'narrow utilitarianism' (because this did not offer adequate theoretical explanation of the questions dealt with) and 'abstract theoretical debate' (because this ignored the connection between the question discussed and life itself, practice and experience). It can be deduced from these instructions that since the autumn of 1956 the party leadership has chosen to pursue a middle course; now it is no longer only parrot-learning and dogmatism that are rejected, as between 1953 and the summer of 1956, but also the utilitarianism which since then has been recognised as a danger that might diminish the ideological and consequently the political influence of the party.

[1] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, January, 1957, p. 27.

The object of party training : the up-to-date functionary

The report which has been quoted above is significant in another way: for the first time the aims of party schools for functionaries are specifically stated. Since Stalin's death the Soviet press has repeatedly reflected the desire of the leaders to train a new and more modern type of party functionary. The first indication was given early in August, 1953, immediately after Malenkov's speech introducing changes in economic policy. *Pravda* (August 4, 1953) attacked a number of party organisations for choosing functionaries solely by the criterion of 'devotion,' without paying any attention to their professional competence and qualifications.

In the second half of 1955, when preparations were being made for the twentieth congress, the demand for practical and professionally trained party functionaries was given special emphasis. 'At different times different demands are made on the party member; a new content is given to the idea of the political militant. . . . Whoever fears to show initiative, whoever waits at every turn for an order from above and refuses to listen to voices from below, whoever does not strive to find his support among the masses, is no Communist. He is a hopeless bureaucrat and not the fighter that a party member ought to be.' New developments required 'an extension of knowledge, the development of the functionary's initiative, and boldness.'[1]

To accomplish the new tasks the post-Stalin leadership required a more modern type of party functionary who, without forfeiting the determination and firmness of the Stalinist functionary, was more closely linked with the population and able to use initiative and professional knowledge in practical economic matters. 'Everything concerns the party functionary—atom bombs, bast shoes, and the struggles in Indonesia, for he is both the conscience and the real master of the world.'[2]

To a large extent both the changes in party training since 1953, as well as (though certainly not always) the changes in the party apparatus were designed to replace the old Stalinist *apparatchiki,* distinguished for their hardness brutality, and aggressiveness in political disputes, but only rarely for their professional knowledge, by new, younger, and better-educated party functionaries, more qualified in practical matters and particularly in economics and at the same time thoroughly reliable politically. Such functionaries, the party leaders hope, will be produced by the new and enlarged system of party training. The object of the party schools is made explicit and emphatic: it is 'not merely to instil into the students a certain amount of knowledge, but to train them as party functionaries who are ideologically sound and firm in their principles, who understand the party's policy and are capable of putting it into operation.'

Thus the development of party training since Stalin's death, and particularly since autumn 1956, would suggest that the idea, widely held in the non-Soviet world, that 'ideology is dying out' is at least premature. It is of course possible, and indeed probable, that ideological motives in determining the party leadership's policy play a smaller part today than they did twenty years ago. Important political decisions are today made more for economic and current political reasons, and are less influenced by ideological formulas and quotations from the classics than they were in Stalin's time. On the other hand, it is certainly incorrect, or at least premature, to talk of the 'withering away of ideology' or to ignore the importance of political training. It is true that from 1953 to 1955 training was so closely linked to practical economic questions that ideological problems necessarily receded into the background. But the very fact that the new policies announced at the twentieth congress, and the steps taken since then—such as the intervention in Hungary or the changes in economic administration in the spring of 1957—are always, now as before, announced in ideological terms, given an ideological explanation and justification, proves that ideology and political training still play a large part and have indeed recently attained still greater significance.

[1] *Partiinaya Zhizn,* 1955, 6, leading article.

[2] A. Gorelov, 'Patriotism and the party spirit,' *Zvezda,* 1955, 5.

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